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                            ABSTRACT.                             
 
     In this paper a Cobb-Douglas utility function is  introduced 
and solved for a dynamic equation of  property crime supply and 
its determinants, namely deterrents and income. Thereafter, all 
variables are empirically tested, by means of a simultaneous 
equations model, for the sign and magnitude of their mutual 
relationships in  a  panel  of Italy and its two economically and 
culturally different  areas, the North and the South. The period 
scrutinized is 1980-95 and the results obtained widely differ 
among the two. When appropriately modeled and instrumented, in 
fact, property crime is found to react to police and criminal 
justice deterrence, and also to incomes, with different  parameter 
magnitudes and significance. The same diversity applies to the 
parameters related to deterrence, flawed in quite a few cases by 
scarce law enforcement and productivity, and to those related to 
local incomes, which still reflect for the South a tendency of 
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                          INTRODUCTION.  
                          
   The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretically sound 
and empirically estimable model of property crime supply and 
demand. The methodology adopted follows a two-step procedure: i) 
evaluating the theoretical relationships between property crime 
and its determinants, by means of an optimal control model based 
on Becker's utilitarian cost/benefit behavior under the constraint 
of specific incentives, ii) extending and improving this model to 
achieve a full-fledged estimable systemic form. 
  This procedure fully exploits rationality embedded within each 
step, since it utilizes the optimizing choices of the first 
[Becker, 1968] and  the information available from both exogenous 
and instrumental variables of the second [Taylor, 1978; Vandaele, 
1978]. The model so obtained provides the necessary structure to 
empirically estimate all of the relevant crime relationships in 
the context of a 3SLS simultaneous equation system applied to the 
case of Italy. 
  To date, a restricted albeit interesting literature on 
empirical testing of Italy's crime exists [Marselli and Vannini, 
1996, 1997; Scorcu and Cellini, 1998; Lee, 2000], although its   
results are in general based on estimable models that do not rely 
on optimizing assumptions, and/or do not adopt system estimators.  
This practice, however, is not unfrequent for other country 
analyses as well, e.g. the U.S. [Sjoquist, 1973], England and 
Wales [Wolpin, 1978; Wong, 1995], Canada [Avio and Clark, 1976], 
and Germany [Entorf and Spengler, 2000], amongst many more. 
  This kind of modeling essentially reduces crime dynamics to a 
single supply-of-crime equation, and by assuming away the issue of 
rationality, produces estimable forms of crime equations which are 
suboptimal with respect to Becker's theoretical insights. By 
consequence, many results are econometrically inconsistent due to 
simultaneous equation bias and lack of proper instrumentation   
[Taylor, 1978]. In this paper, instead, the necessary technical   
underpinnings are supplied to be able to yield a theoretically and 
empirically consistent estimable system-based model of criminal 
behavior.  
  To perform this task, a Cobb-Douglas utility function of 
property crime and labor allocation with positive and negative 
incentives will be examined and, given its First-Order  Conditions 
(FOCs), solved for a dynamic equation of crime supply  and  its 
determinants, namely  the incentives: police prevention, judicial 
repression and incomes. Of these, the first two represent the   
demand for crime, while incomes are necessary to close the model. 
  As previously advanced, the experiment regards Italian total  
property crime and its correlates for the period 1980-95, and is  
carried  out via a systemic 3SLS fixed-effects panel regression 
model applied to both national and regional (North and South) 
data. This discriminant represents an interesting  exercise on the 
different locational relationships that may exist  between crime   
and  its determinants  in the context of different sociocultural 
and economic environments,  given  the  well-known relative 
backwardness of the South [Putnam, 1993] and the socially   3
entrenched 'mafia' phenomenon of some areas therof. The 3SLS model 
results are finally double checked via a dynamic panel 
specification to account for  endogenous lagged variables therein 
excluded. 
     Sect. 1 introduces the utility model and its solution for a 
dynamic equation of crime supply and its determinants, while Sect. 
2 exhibits the taxonomy and descriptive statistics of the major 
variables involved. Sect. 3 justifies the need for  simultaneous  
equation estimation to capture all the structural and reduced-form  
feedbacks of the crime model, while Sect. 4 provides the 
econometric  results of both regional areas, characterized by 
significantly different impacts of incentives over the supply of 
crime, and of crime and deterrence over incomes as well as   




  Sect. 1. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF PROPERTY CRIME BEHAVIOR. 
 
 
  If criminal agents are assumed to behave rationally by 
allocating labor and crime in response to given incentives, as the 
massive literature on crime posits [Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973, 
1975, 1996; Taylor, 1978; Wolpin, 1978, Vandaele, 1978; Cameron, 
1988; Eide, 1994; DiIulio, 1996; Levitt, 1997, 1999] - just to 
name a few - then property crime stands alone as being the proper 
candidate. In fact, property crime in principle fits the   
rationality issues implied by the utility model to a larger extent 
than crime against the person (e.g. homicide, assault). The latter 
is in fact notably less rational, as its plans are normally not 
influenced by cost/benefit considerations [Taylor, 2000]. For   
such reasons, the ensuing discussion is limited to the analysis of 
property crime (henceforth simply denoted as 'crime', unless 
otherwise specified) and its determinants. 
     The representative individual - along Becker's  lines  -  is 
assumed  to  be free to choose, at any moment of time, to supply a 
certain amount of crime (C t , illegal activity)  or of labor  (L t , 
legal dependent or independent employment activity). The framework 
is couched in terms of a deterministic and discrete dynamic 
nonseparable Cobb-Douglas utility function (U), which constitutes, 
with due variants depending on the environment (e.g. the 
discounted CAPM model), a standard toolkit of optimal control and 
cannot be dismissed without losing important, if not essential, 
information about the dynamics and the constraints of the process 
analyzed. 
  In the present context, the individual maximizes over a finite  
time span the utility stream stemming from labor (L t ) and crime 
(C t ), subject to motion constraints of police prevention and 
criminal justice repression (RP t ), known as 'deterrence' or as 
'negative incentives', and of percapita real incomes or wages 
(Y t ), known as 'positive incentives'. 
  Technically we have the following maximand: 
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I.    Max U =  t
T
= ∑ 1 [ (C t
ν L t
v 1− ) + .5 (θ 1 RP t + θ 2 Y t
2 ) ] 
     s.t.:   II.  RP t+1 =  1 α Y t   +  2 α RP t  +  3 α C t   
                   III. Y t+1  =  1 β Y t   +  2 β L t   +   3 β C t   
 
where time t  ∈ T, C t  and L t  are the control variables, and the  
other  two variables (eqs. II and III) are the state contraints. 
The first of these (RP t ) may be  considered as a strict sense 
constraint from the viewpoint of criminals  and as an implicit 
demand for crime  [Ehrlich,  1996]  from  the  rest  of  the 
society. Conversely, the second control (Y t ) is a general   
incentive (job, wage or income opportunities) from the viewpoint   
of  criminals  [Ehrlich, 1973] and  a strict-sense constraint from 
the rest  of  the  society,  i.e.  a 'state-of-nature' function. 
     The first bracketed expression in eq. I is the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function where ν and 1-ν are the imputed shares of  the  
controls C t  and L t  (for ν<1), with unit elasticity of 
substitution. While on a single individual's basis, selection 
among them constitutes a typical binary choice problem (i.e. ν is 
either 0 or 1), in aggregate the share represents the percentage 
of individuals committing crimes, including recidives. In essence,  
the  utility equation may be viewed as a selective 'supply of 
crime' function, insofar as the representative agent is free to 
decide whether  to supply labor force or crime [Becker, 1968; Sah, 
1991]. As usual, utility is expected to be concave in its 
arguments, whereby U'(C t ), U'(L t ) > 0 and U"(C t ), U"(L t ) <  0.  
  The second bracketed expression is a quadratic  weighted  sum  
of the states RP t  and Y t , where Σ i θ i ,(i=1,2). Hence weight θ i  
represents  the  contributive  share  of  each state variable 
entering the utility  decision  making. Different  from above, 
weights θ i  are not determined by  binary  choices  at  the single 
individual's level, but each weight for each individual may freely 
range from 0 to 1, and be  more  or  less  independent from other 
individuals' choices, as posited by the 'spillover effect' 
approach [Sah, 1991; van Dijk, 1994].  
    As  to  the  state  equations  of  motion,  parameters  α i  ( i=1,3) 
and  β i  (i=1,...3) are differently signed depending on the socio- 
cultural and institutional environment as well as on the current 
economic conditions  of  the  country  examined.  In  the present 
context, these parameters will be given a rather rough and 
introductory definition, which will be made more explicit in Sect. 
3.  
  In eq. II, the deterrence state equation, parameter  1 α  
reflects the income scale effect over the demand for crime. In 
principle, the sign of the parameter is uncertain due to the 
individual-property rights tradeoff associated to developing 
democracies (fn. 1). In fact,  higher incomes carry a lower demand 
for crime in terms of tighter property-rights protection, and at   5
the same time an increased concern for constitutionally granted 
individual-rights protection of the offender (reduction of police 
powers, right to legal defense, milder conviction terms, paroling, 
etc.) We thus expect  1 α  to be positive (negative) if the former 
(latter) instances prevail. In general, however,  1 α  < 0 because a 
milder official response to crime causes potential victims to 
raise personal security expenses (e.g. locks, alarms) or to 
advocate stiffer self protection, like the right to carry guns. In 
a cross section of incomes, the magnitude of the parameter is 
likely to attenuate and even tend do zero with lower-income 
percentiles, as security expenses become a higher share of 
earnings [Imrohoroglu et al, 1996; Levitt, 1999]. 
 Parameter  2 α  represents the ARX(1) coefficient of the   
overtime dynamics of RP t  and  thus theoretically ranges from -∞ to 
+∞. Both its sign and magnitude - other things equal - depend upon  
the generic value the given society assigns to a growing or 
falling repression and prevention apparatus [Glaeser et al., 1996; 
Sah, 1991], thereby causing the variable to be positively or 
negatively trended, respectively.  
 Parameter  3 α  bears a similar assignment concept, which is   
connected to the societal reaction to current crime. It represents 
the 'willingness' of the society to respond to delinquency via the 
appointed institutions, namely police and the judiciary. It is 
known also as the 'official stigma  for crime', and differs 
somewhat from the 'social stigma', which is included in the 
utility costs of committing crimes [Glaeser et al., 1996; 
Rasmusen, 1996]. In general we expect  3 α  > 0 whose magnitude 
depends,  coeteris paribus, on the intensity with  which the 
society intends to react against crime by deploying all of its 
available and institutionally-granted countermeasures, like police 
and judiciary staffing, restrictive laws and regulations, etc. 
Hence, the higher (lower)  3 α  the less (more) resilient is sociey 
towards crime. In more rare cases we can also have  3 α < 0, i.e. a 
society that endorses crime
1. 
  The deterrence equation may be conceived of as an indirect or 
implicit demand for crime, henceforth simply denoted as 'demand 
for crime', with the proviso that the degree of stigma may be 
hidden not only in parameter  3 α , insofar as economic 
considerations reflect cultural instances, but also in other more 
specific variables that affect RP t , as will be made clear in Sect. 
3
2.     
                                                           
1 Feudal and holigarchic  societies, in order to maintain their privileges and 
parasitary rents,  typically  endorse  several kinds of economic and noneconomic 
harassment  towards  nonmembers [Bardhan, 1997]. In addition, sociodemocratic 
societies by recognizing equal opportunities, individual rights and paroling, 
either automatically endorse (some amount of)  criminal  behavior  that exploits 
these rules (free ridership), or willingly refrain from pursuing - to different 
extents - several kinds of offenses and petty crime to avoid social displeasure 
and  gain votes from low-income and low-employment classes. In both  cases, a 
steady-state crime rate on behalf respectively of the dominant and the poor 
class is ensured.  
 
2 An explicit demand for crime would be stated in terms  related to the market   6
 
    In eq. III, the income state equation, all other things equal, 
parameter  1 β  represents the ARX(1) coefficient  of percapita income 
dynamics. We expect  1 β  ≅  1 if the process is a martingale  and  1 β  
< (>) 1 if the process is stationary (nonstationary). These 
characteristics much depend on the  long-term  inherent  economic 
conditions of the country like technological progress, human 
capital, etc., a typical subject matter of  growth  theory [Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin]. All in all, whichever growth pattern the 
country  may follow, we generally expect  1 β  ≠  0. 
    Parameter  2 β  is quite intuitively  positively  signed, since 
labor constitutes an essential production factor with respect to 
percapita income, although the equation is not a production 
function in a strict sense. In fact, not only physical but also 
service output provides a positive incentive vis-a'-vis crime 
supply [Ehrlich, 1996]. Parameter   3 β  should instead be negatively 
signed since property  crime is normally expected to hamper growth 
due to the disruption of property rights and subsequent 
uncertainty about production, investment and consumption  plans 
[Svensson, 1998].  
     The discrete-state  Hamiltonian  function  (H)  of  all  the  




     H = C t
ν L t
v 1− + .5 (θ 1 RP t +  θ 2 Y t
2 )  +  11 ,t+ λ  ( 1 α Y t  +  2 α RP t  +  3 α C t )  
      +  21 ,t+ λ  ( 1 β Y t  +  2 β L t  +  3 β C t )  
 
where  11 ,t+ λ  and  21 ,t+ λ  are the costate variables. After taking the   
first derivatives with respect to their arguments (FOCs) and   
performing  the necessary time derivations, an  equation of motion  
of the crime rate supply in terms of its determinants can be   
retrieved  (see the Appendix for technical details), as follows: 
 
IV. dc t =  1 φ rp t  +  2 φ y t  +  3 φ c t   
 
with the following percapita value lowercases which will be 
henceforth used: c t  = C t /L t , dc t  = c t -c t−1, rp t  = RP t /L t ,  y t  =  
Y t /L t .  Eq. IV is the theoretical model equation of crime supply, 
whose  parameter values  i φ  (i=1,...3) by construction depend on the 
sign and magnitude of  parameters α i  (i=1,3) and β i  (i=1,...3) of 
its own determinants, i.e. the state constraints of eqs. II and 
III.  
  As to the first two parameters of eq. IV, it turns out that if  
the reaction of repression and prevention (negative incentives) to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
for stolen goods [Vandaele, 1978; Ehrlich, 1996]. A proxy thereof is the 
reported implicit demand for crime which implies that relaxation (tightening) of 
deterrence raises (lowers) opportunities to buy stolen goods.  
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crime - the official 'stigma' for crime - is sizable ( 3 α → ∞), and 
if incomes (positive incentives) are negatively affected by crime 
( 3 β  <  0), or if in any case the former exceeds the latter (| 3 α | > 
| 3 β |),  dc t  is negatively affected by both incentives. If the 
opposite occurs, | 3 α |→ 0 or | 3 α | < | 3 β |, their impact is 
positively signed. In synthesis, a society characterized by stigma 
for crime and significantly involved at fighting crime will 
exhibit decreasing returns to crime from greater income 
opportunities and stiffer deterrence. Under these premises, as 
necessary and sufficient conditions, both positive and negative 
incentives are negatively signed in eq. IV. 
  The sign of the adjustment parameter of the crime rate   
dynamics,  3 φ , critically depends on  1 α ,  3 α  and  3 β  and is expected 
to be positive to ensure a positive steady state crime rate level, 
once dc t  is set to zero. This occurs, for  1 α  < 0, if | 3 α | > | 3 β |, 
i.e. if the above-stated premises apply.  
  As advanced in the Introduction, eq. IV clearly enough 
represents the only viable model to address crime equations in an 
optimizing environment characterized by the presence of positive 
and negative incentives, assuming these be simultaneosly 
endogeneized as well in a supply-demand context. 
  Apart from that, substitution of income for unemployment (the 
unit complement to L t ) as a determinant of crime supply - as 
performed in some more or less recent applied literature - would 
violate the state and control formats of eq. I, and cause the 
optimizing model to collapse. The ensuing derivation of eq. IV 
would thus be impossible, and any  forceful representation thereof 
- be it deterministic or stochastic, even after barring  the 
econometric simultaneity issue (see Sect. 3) - is suboptimal and 
its results unwarranted. As a result, unemployment should be 




        Sect. 2. ITALIAN PROPERTY CRIME AND RELATED STATISTICS.           
 
 
  Italy is a republic founded in 1948 and  divided  into  twenty 
local  administrative  units  (called  regioni, henceforth denoted 
as 'regions'). For historic, social and economic reasons  [Putnam,  
1993], Italy is traditionally subdivided into two different 
geographical areas of almost the same amount of  population  and  
surface: the North, which includes eleven regions, and the South 
which includes nine.  
  The period covered in this essay is  1980-95,  the  reported 
data are annual and are drawn from  the  panel  set  of  all  the 
administrative  units.  The  official  source  is  the   National 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT). The regional crime-related data are 
available to date, while the economic data do not extend beyond 
1996, and quite a few not beyond 1995. Hence the full panel is 
forcefully restricted to that year, providing a total of 16   
observations for each of the twenty regions.   8
     Property crime in Italy, according to ISTAT,   includes  all 
forms of  officially  reported  indictable  crimes  and  offenses 
committed by and against private individuals
3. It includes theft 
(larceny and motor vehicle theft),  burglary, robbery, extortion,  
ransom  kidnaping,  rustling,  money  laundering  and fraud. 
   All of the property crime figures refer to reported  crimes. 
Their entire-country mean ratio to unreported  crimes  is unknown, 
though rough estimates hover around 2/3. The ratio of reported 
crimes committed by unknown offenders to the total of reported 
crimes is instead known, and stands slightly above an appalling 
90% [CRENOS, 1999]. Finally, the crimes reported include also 
those committed by nonnationals, of which most are legal and 
illegal immigrants from non-EC countries. 
     In absolute terms, the recorded  number  of  total  property 
crimes has passed from 1,433,329 in 1980 (of  which  54%  in  the 
North) to 2,228,528 in 1995 (of  which  50%  in  the  North),  an 
increase of 1.55 times (1.43 in the North and 1.70 in the South). 
As may be easily seen, no substantial regional differences  exist 
in these numbers, nor is the property crime rate - by and large - 
any different  from  West  European  standards  for  the  period 
considered [United Nations, 1994]
4 .  
     The Italian penal code distinguishes two  forms  of  arrest: 
temporary apprehension (fermo, which expires within 48  hours  if 
no  police  filing  follows),  and  arrest  (arresto,  which   is 
subsequent  to  the  former,  and  involves  police  filing   and 
immediate incarceration).  However,  data  unavailability  and/or 
reliability  and  regional  disaggregation   problems   make   it 
impossible  to  utilize,  among  others,  police  arrest  figures 
comparable and compatible with crime rate statistics. Arrests are 
in fact supplied on a national basis and are aggregated with   
nonproperty crimes.  
     The only available  proxy  for  property  crime  arrests  is 
represented by the regional  number  of  persons  apprehended  by 
police, following a reported criminal action and entering prison. 
This process is commonly  denoted  as  'liberty  deprivation'  or 
simply incarceration. Recorded crimes  that  are  not  filed  for 
public prosecution decay within 48 hours and  the  individual  is 
                                                           
3 Indictment in terms of crime taxonomy and related minimum  and maximum penalty  
is  regulated  in  the  national  criminal  laws contained in the  amended   
Penal  Code  and  in  other  statutes. Enforcement is  assigned  to  police  and  
to  other  sector-  or area-specific authorities  (e.g.  town  constabularies,  
rangers, Finance  Guard,  border  police,  etc.).  The  age  of   criminal 
responsibility is 18, and any  individual  is  chargeable  unless mentally 
disordered or chronically  intoxicated  by  alcohol  and drug abuse. Punishment 
is usually more severe when the individual is affiliated to organized crime 
(e.g.  mafia).  The  Penal  Code considers the violent crimes of  robbery,   
extortion  and  ransom kidnaping as property crimes because their main intent is 
to gain property.  
 
4 The international United Nations statistics on property crime  are  not 
directly comparable due to some countries' undereportings or data 
unavailability, including Italy itself. For the four major crimes (robbery, 
total theft, burglary and fraud) and for the  selected median year 1986, Italy's 
tally officially stands 50 to 60% less than the ISTAT figure. Provision made for 
the necessary correction, the Italian crime rate would lay slightly beneath 
Germany (Federal Republic) and England and Wales.  
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automatically acquitted. Otherwise,  incarceration  is  confirmed 
and hearing, investigation and sentencing follow.  
     Adequate statistical coverage is provided by the data on the 
number of incarcerations following police filings,  disaggregated 
both by region and by type of crime. ISTAT tabulates two distinct 
categories of incarcerations, respectively labeled as 'by region 
of committed crime' and 'by region and country of birth'. This 
breakdown enables computing the percentage of crime mobility 
across regions: in the North, as an average for the entire period, 
Northern-born citizens committed half of property crimes, while 
30% were committed by foreign nationals and the remaining 20% by 
Southern-born citizens. In the South, comparable statistics 
associate a 3% figure to Northern-born citizens, 80% to Southern-
born residents and the rest to foreign nationals. 
  In the present context, the first category is chosen since the 
second is by principle irrelevant to the purposes established in 
Sect. 1, namely, the analysis of the  relationship between extant 
crime and its determinants. In other words, prevention, repression 
and incomes operate on the basis of actual observable crimes, not 
on their geographical provenance. However, this distinction will 
prove not to be entirely immaterial for the purposes of 
interpreting some end results in Sect. 4. 
    Adequate statistical coverage is also available for the 
number of property crime sentences, which  includes also offenses 
and petty crimes that by law or by  common use do not involve 
incarceration, but usually only fining. Figure availability of 
incarcerations and sentences enables the breakdown of deterrence   
rp t  of Sect.1 into its two components: police prevention or 
'clearance' (p t ) and judicial repression (r t )
5.  
        Table 1 provides the period and both national and regional 
descriptive mean statistics of total percapita property crime c t , 
of incarcerations p t  and of sentences r t , all expressed in 
percentage terms over the resident population. Included are also 
the percapita real GDP levels y t  (real incomes), expressed in 
thousand Liras (1,000 Liras in 1995 were approximately worth 70 
cents of a Dollar), the rate of unemployment u t  expressed in 
percentage terms - computed by ISTAT as the ratio of unemployment 
to total active population - and percapita total employment l t  = 
L t /P t , where L t  is the sum of dependent and independent workers 
and P t  is resident population. The period covered by u t  is 
restricted by data availability and reliability to the years 1983-
94. The table includes also the percentage mean annual growth 
rates of the variables (in brackets) and the Z test statistic for 
different variable means between the North and the South (p values 
in brackets).  
 
                                                           
5 Incarcerations, by definition, are more closely akin to incapacitation than to 
deterrence, although in practice their effects over the crime rate are 
indistinguishable, except by means of cross-crime analysis [Levitt, 1998].  





                             Table 1.                             
 
Basic crime, judicial, real income and labor statistics, 1980-95.       
 
              c t        p t         r t        y t          u t *      l t   
 
Italy       2.504     .068      .079     20,617      9.95     .400 
           (4.92)    (2.39)    (12.7)    (1.60)     (2.62)  (-.21) 
 
North       2.593     .063      .077     25,550      7.61     .448 
           (4.44)    (2.52)    (12.9)    (1.74)     (2.26)  (-.10) 
 
South       2.395     .074      .082     15,854     16.13     .343 
           (5.50)    (2.23)    (12.5)    (1.42)     (3.61)  (-.33) 
 
Z-test      .108     -.258     -.110     1.835     -1.690    2.212 
           (.914)    (.796)    (.911)    (.066)    (.091)   (.027) 
 
* Covers the period 1983-94. 
 
     As one can easily notice, only the first and third variable 
level rates do not differ at the regional level within a 10% 
significance level, while incarcerations (p t ) are somewhat higher 
in the South as compared to the North, because of a sizably higher  
quantity of property violent crimes (robberies, extortions, 
kidnapings) and homicides for which a tougher intervention  is   
customarily  required
6.  This difference is manifested by the 
reported Z-test value whose significance extends well beyond the 
10% level, although there seems to be a tendency for the North to 
pick up with the South, as shown by the growth rates of 
incarcerations. 
  Percapita mean real  GDP levels and unemployment/employment 
rates also significantly differ, as evidenced by the Z-test 
statistics. On average incomes are 70% higher in the North, and 
the gap is not bound to be closing anytime soon, given almost 
identical annual growth rates. Unemployment rates also 
significantly differ across regions in line with incomes, and in 
the South they appear to be twice as higher as in the North. 
Employment percapita figures also differ and present a growth 
pattern significantly unfavorable to the South.  
  These series are tested for stationarity by means of the 
                                                           
6 For the entire period considered, the mean percent percapita values of 
homicides and of violent property crimes (robberies plus extortions plus 
kidnapings) - all indictable crimes for which incarceration is mandatory - 
respectively are .02 and .41 in the North and .06 and .79 in the South. 
Moreover, for the same time stretch, the mean share of violent property crimes 
over total property crime is 15.5% in the North and 32.1% in the South. Finally, 
violent property crime recidiveness, computed as the ratio of the number of 
crimes to the number of offenders on a yearly basis, is 8.90 for the North and 
13.50 for the South.  
   11
modified Dickey-Fuller test for the null of stationarity  across  
all the national panel individuals  [Im et al., 1997], henceforth 
denoted as IPS test. The series are one-lag first-differenced 
without and with a trend, while the 'tbar' 5% and 10% critical 
values for rejection (with 20 individuals, i.e. the Italian 
regions, and 16 observations) respectively are -1.87 and -1.79, 
and -2.52 and -2.44. Regional panel  results are unreported as 
they do not significantly differ from the nationwide results, 
which are exhibited in Table 2, together with growth volatility 
indexes, computed as the ratio between standard errors and mean 
growth rates. Volatility expresses the relative magnitude, i.e. 
the spread, of overtime percent changes, and is a 'safe' measure 
of cyclical amplitudes. 
 
      Table  2. 
 
IPS test statistics for stationarity and volatility indexes of the 
variables of Table 1. Italy, 1980-95. 
 
            c t         p t        r t       y t       u t *      l t  
    
No trend     -1.233    -2.790   -2.139   -.828   -1.736   -1.728 
 
Trend        -2.161    -2.781   -2.531  -2.260   -1.792   -1.648 
 
Volatility    4.718    12.530   12.730   1.314    8.518    9.825 
 
* Covers the period 1983-94. 
 
  The picture that emerges from this table is essentially that  
crime, incomes, unemployment and labor force are significantly 
(within the 10% bound) trended, letting both forms of deterrence 
significantly untrended. The here unreported crime supply (dc t ) is 
stationary, as its no-trend and trend 'tbar' statistics 
respectively are -2.494 and -2.788. 
  Moreover, and quite unexpectedly, real GDP growth is less 
volatile than any other growth variable, including that of  the 
unemployment rate, perhaps because of loopholes or deficiencies in 
the labor data collection and in the computation of activity rates 
made by ISTAT. Real GDP growth is also less volatile - though to a 
minor albeit unexpected extent - than percapita employment, and 
this holds also at the regional level. In the South the former 
stands at 1.63 and in the North at 1.09, while the latter at 7.58 
and 14.0 respectively. 
  Even barring the relative shortness of the time span of the 
unemployment series, which would straitjacket the experiment to a 
minor number of observations, its high cyclicality  corroborates, 
from the observational viewpoint, the theoretical argument set out 
in Sect. 1 against using this variable as a regressor in 
stochastic crime equations. 
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    This Section is devoted to the stochastic estimation of eqs. 
II to IV, given the parameter and the optimizing constraints set 
out in Sect. 1. These constraints are  perfectly consistent with 
the need to adopt a multiequation approach to empirically estimate 
the crime dynamics of eq. IV in a supply-demand context. 
          In fact, simultaneous  equation  bias  and/or  errors  in   
variables causes single-equation OLS estimation to produce   
inconsistent parameter estimates, a commonplace in crime-related 
models [Taylor, 1978; Wolpin, 1978; Ehrlich and  Brower,  1987;   
Cameron, 1988; Wong, 1995; Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1997]. In quite 
a number of instances, many variables are simultaneously   
correlated with each other, e.g. the number of police stationed 
and crime rates, high incomes and property crime (the 'high-loot'  
hypothesis), high crime and stiffer sentence terms (the 'backfire' 
hypothesis) , etc. In particular, the 'high-loot' hypothesis, 
pioneered by Ehrlich [1973], maintains that - all other things 
equal i.e. barring income opportunities and security expenses like 
antitheft devices, locks, policing, etc. - higher incomes call for 
higher property crimes (parameter φ 2  > 0 in eq. 1). Hence, in 
general, 'potential criminals can expect more loot in states with 
a more skewed income distribution' [Taylor, 1978, p.44]. The 
'backfire' hypothesis [Clear, 1996] posits that stiffer 
sentencing, in the form of longer and/or harsher terms of 
inprisonment, causes higher crime rates due to magnified spillover 
effects [Sah, 1991; Glaeser et al., 1996] across inmates, 
especially with the young and/or in presence of overcrowding 
[Levitt, 1996]
7.  
  By consequence, the assumption of exogeneity does not imply 
predeterminedness but must imply some structural form  imposed by 
the analyst. In addition, variables measurement errors may not be 
unfrequent when dealing with number of reported crimes, number of 
apprehensions, etc., so that recourse to instrumental variables or 
to other specific techniques is made necessary to avoid the well 
known fenomenon of parameter attenuation [Taylor, 1978] or 
negativity [Levitt, 1998].  
     A systemic 3SLS [Zellner, 1962]  multiequation approach  to 
estimate eq. II - IV is therefore appropriate to account for these 
occurrences and to exploit any information stemming from select 
instruments. As previously advanced, this consistent type of 
estimation will regard not only the national but also the regional 
panels, to be able to discern, if any, the locational differences 
of the relationship between crime and  its determinants.  
     Because of data unavailability or nonmatching surveys,  many  
interesting socioeconomic determinants of crime cannot be used.   
Variables such as the percentage of southerners committing crimes 
in the northern regions, especially in the context of organized   
                                                           
7 Empirical research on the 'high-loot' hypothesis produces mixed results, and 
significantly hinges on income distribution data availability or on econometric 
methodology [Levitt, 1999; Lee, 2000]. The 'backfire' hypothesis, which is 
virtually the opposite of incapacitation, encounters the same measurement 
problems when applied at the aggregate level [Levitt, 1998]. Both hypotheses, 
quite intuitively, share measurement error and simultaneity bias.  
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crime  (e.g.  mafia)  and  organized  gangs, generally involved in 
robbery, extortions, smuggling and kidnaping, the percentage of 
families lying in the lowest income  percentiles  - to account for  
income distribution effects [Ehrlich, 1973; van Dijk, 1991; 
Freeman,  1996; Imrohoroglu et al., 1996; Levitt, 1999; Lee, 2000] 
-, correctional figures like prison and security expenses, inmate 
population and beds available, or specific victimization data 
[Levitt, 1999], are unavailable, incomplete or even classified and 
undisclosed to the general public. 
  On the other hand, sufficient data series exist for the 
variables introduced in Sect. 2, like the splitting of the 
deterrence variable between prevention and repression, and for 
other data which may be used as predetermined or instrumental 
variables. Therefore, eqs. II to IV  can be endogeneized and duly 
modified and extended, to produce a stochastic empirically 
estimable model representation that embeds the parameters of the 
optimizing model set out in eq. I. We can thus easily construct a 
systemic model of crime dynamics made up of the four following 
stochastic equations: 
 
1.  dc t =  φ 11p t  +  φ 12 r t  + φ 2 y t  + φ 3 c t  + η 1,t 
 
2. p t =  α 11y t  +  α 12 r t  + α 13c t + ϕ 1 dc t  + ϕ 2 dp t  + ϕ 3 s t + η 2,t 
 
3. r t =  α 21y t  +  α 22p t  + α 23c t + ϑ 1 dc t  + ϑ 2 dr t  + η 3,t 
 
4. y t =  ω 1 l t  +  ω 2 h t  + ω 3 dc t  + ω 4 p t  + ω 5 r t + η 4,t 
 
where all variables are expressed in logs, dx t  stands for the 
first difference of variable x t  (any of the variables listed), and 
parameters  φ 11 and φ 12  are clumped together into parameter φ 1  of 
eq. IV, α 11 and α 21 into α 1 ,  α 12  and α 22 into α 2 , and α 13 and 
α 23 into α 3  of eq. II. Other parameters are introduced to fully 
exploit the simultaneity and the dynamics of the relationships 
(ϕ 1 ), or  to express the 'curvature' of the function (ϕ 2  and 
ϑ 1 ), or to add to the model's information with the introduction 
of variables s t  and h t , which respectively denote the amount of 
police staffing and human capital
8. Of these two, in particular, 
the former augments the repression equation by capturing a scale 
effect on the demand for crime [Levitt, 1997], while the latter 
augments the production function as required by standard growth 
                                                           
8 Police staffing, i.e. the amount of police stationed, may be viewed as a proxy 
for the ratio of crimes committed by unknown authors to total reported crimes, a 
typically measurement-error variable [Marselli and Vannini, 1996, 1997]. The 
proxy is supposedly unflawed, as a larger presence of police would raise crime 
reporting by the local population. The human capital variable is computed as the 
sample period sum of real government current education expenditures, discounted 
by a constant 5% annual interest rate [Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995]. 
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theory modeling [Barro and Sala-i-Martin,  1995]. Other variables 
were obvious candidates as regressors (e.g. education in eq. 1), 
but detected  multicollinearity caused them to be discarded. 
Variables η 1,t to η 4,t are IID disturbances with zero mean and known 
sample variance.  
  While eq. 1 is the stochastic replica of eq. IV with 
separation of deterrents, and represents the supply of crime, eqs. 
2-3 are the implicit demand for crime  functions, and eq. 4 is the 
modified production function [Ehrlich, 1996]. 
  A few words are due on the expected sign and magnitude of the 
parameters of eqs. 1 to 4. 
  In eq. 1, parameters φ 11 and φ 12  are negatively signed from 
the mathematical derivation of φ 1  in eq. IV (Sect.1). They 
respectively represent the 'certainty' and the 'severity' costs 
associated to illegal property appropriation. In principle, if the 
potential criminal is rational in Becker's sense and is risk-
averse [Ehrlich, 1975, 1996; Taylor, 1987], the probability of 
apprehension constitutes a major deterrent to crime, as ensuing 
incarceration would involve a sequel of legal and extralegal costs 
(legal fees, bailout expenses, social stigma, etc.) to be borne 
along with conviction and that may be not worthwhile the value of 
the loot. We thus expect, in a rationality context, |φ 11| > |φ 12 |.  
 Parameter  φ 3  measures the long-run adjustment of crime 
dynamics with respect to the current crime rate stock. Adjustment 
spells 'inertial' determination of crime rates, namely, their 
dynamics as unaffected by the select incentives. It implies   
nonindependent crime decisions for new entrants  and recidives, 
and measures thus the 'spillover effect' [Sah, 1991; Glaeser et 
al., 1996] thereby involving the estimation of the steady-state 
crime supply, by definition closely linked to the long-run customs 
texture of the society. The parameter in theory bears no specific 
expectational sign, but must be consistent with the other 
parameters of the equation so as to produce, by mathematical 
computation, a positive value of the steady-state crime supply
9. 
  In eqs. 2 and 3, parameters α 11 and α 21 are taken to reflect 
the impact of income levels over the deterrents, and are expected 
to be negatively signed as anticipated in Sect. 1 with reference 
to parameter α 1 . In association with higher incomes, in fact, 
higher demand for civil liberties and rights prompts parliaments 
and governments to enact laws and regulations addressed at safer 
and institutionally-granted individual protection. Therefore, 
sociodemocratic regimes tend to reduce the extent and impact of 
various forms of prevention and repression, in particular with 
respect to minor crimes. Examples among others, as discussed in 
Sect. 1, are the right to legal defense and tighter rules for 
                                                           
9 The arithmetic is simple. If we let dc t = 0 in eq. 1 and solve for c t , the 





[φ 11p t +φ 12 r t +φ 2 y t +η 1,t ] such that c t
* → ∞  as φ 3 →0.  
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apprehension and incarceration, with the obvious emergence of a 
property-rights protection tradeoff. 
 Parameters  α 12  and α 22 represent the mutual relationships 
between repression and prevention that 'influence the .... 
enforcement efforts in determining the probabilities of 
apprehension and conviction' [Ehrlich, 1996, p.60]. More 
precisely, the parameter in eq. 2 essentially reflects the message 
or order of penal justice to police as to whether tighten or relax 
law enforcement by means of incarcerations depending on the 
current stock and growth rate of sentences, while that of eq. 3 
reflects the efficiency and/or workload of penal justice relative 
to police incarcerations, i.e. the promptness and/or willingness 
of judges to operate upon existing and incoming incarcerations, 
known in the professional literature as the 'overload' hypothesis 
[Rasmusen, 1996].    
  These two parameters are expected to be positive (negative) if 
incarcerations can (cannot) grow in line with sentence processing 
and if the latter can (cannot) grow as a function of total 
incarcerations. In general, they represent the upshot of implicit 
- if not explicit - long-term agreements between the authorities 
to meet political, budgeting or  other kinds of requirements (e.g. 
prison capacity constraints) [Ehrlich and Brower, 1987; Sah, 1991; 
Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1997]  of  which typical manifestations are 
paroling, probation acquittal and general amnesties. 
   Parameters  α 13 and  α 23, tucked up into α 3  of eq. II, 
represent the 'stigma-for-crime' reaction of deterrence, namely, 
the willingness of society to respond to crime via the appointed 
institutions or, in other words, the degree to which demand for 
crime officially reacts to supply [Glaeser et al., 1996; Rasmusen, 
1996]). The parameters are expected to be positive, and higher in 
magnitude the stronger the stigma. In some cases they can be 
negatively signed ('endorsement of crime'), namely when deterrence 
is corrupt or inefficient or when the  authorities are strongly 
tied or even identified themselves  with  organized crime in terms 
of 'public gangsterism'  [Marcoullier  and  Young, 1995], like in 
several countries of the dissolved Communist block or of Africa 
and Latin America. 
 Parameters  ϕ 1  and ϑ 1  are the 'dynamic' counterparts of α 13 
and α 23, and reflect the short-run reaction , i.e. the 'speed', of 
authorities in keeping up with crime rates, generally dictated by 
the existence of institutional, economic and even political overt 
or covert arrangements. In other words, repression and prevention 
coeteris paribus positively (negatively) respond to incoming crime 
if the authorities can (cannot) imprison and judge more than a 
given amount of criminals, whether by law, by budgetary reasons, 
or by other unmeasurable or undetectable reasons [Sah, 1991; 
Glaeser et al., 1996]. Parameter negativity implies government 
inefficiency at stemming incoming crime and does not rule out the 
possibility of corruption and malfeasance between criminals and 
officials [DellaPorta and Vannucci, 2000]
10. They may be termed 
                                                           
10 Cyclical and structural productivity 'ceilings' in both forms of deterrence 
may arise due to local (i.e. precinct), regional or nationwide personnel 
congestion or overlapping, limited  budget allocation and conversely electoral   16
'crime cyclical ceilings' to deterrence. 
 Parameters  ϕ 2  and ϑ 2  reflect the 'curvature' of their 
respective functions to detect their adjustment speed and to 
assess, by consequence, the nature of their activity returns. In 
fact, positive (negative) values of the parameters are associated 
to increasing (decreasing) returns, generally associated to the 
quality or quantity of staffing and to their pooling capacity. 
They are similar in kind to the previous two parameters, and may 
thus be comfortably dubbed as 'productivity cyclical ceilings'. 
  Finally, with respect to eq. 4, parameter ω 1 (which 
corresponds to  2 β  in eq. III) indicates the total labor input 
elasticity, and reflects the degree to which it is likely  to 
substitute for criminal activity. Parameter ω 2  involves human 
capital, another substitute for crime and a complement to labor 
[Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995]. Parameters ω 3 ,  ω 4  and ω 5  
respectively pick up the effects over incomes of the growth rates 
of crime, and of the current stocks of prevention and repression. 
Of these, in  theory,  the  first parameter is negative and the 
other two are positive, as increasing crime adversely affects 
economic activity, while extended policing and patroling and 
stiffer sentencing ensure more efficient protection and defense of 
property rights, the safest alley to investments and economic 
growth in a criminal environment [Svensson, 1998].  
 
 
                  Sect. 4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS.                   
 
          Eqs. 1-4 are estimated by a fixed-effects panel
11 [Baltagi, 
1995] 3SLS [Zellner, 1962] instrumental method to produce 
consistent parameter estimations in the presence of simultaneity 
bias and errors in variables, and to gain in information from the 
viewpoint of rational decision makers. The procedure is applied to 
both national and regional data and the results are exhibited in 
Table 3.  
  The 3SLS instrument set includes regional dummies, a trend, 
first-order lagged values of the endogenous and exogenous 
variables and of the following socioeconomic and demographic 
indicators: resident population, GDP shares of industry, 
agriculture and investments, dependent and independent labor 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
cycles, training or educational deficiencies, etc. in the practice of law 
enforcement [Sah, 1991], all leading to crime demand being unable to keep up 
with crime supply. Their measurement in the aggregate is virtually impossible as 
they are contained in the errors in variables [Taylor, 1987], but can pop up in 
several ways, like the one suggested in the present context. 
 
11 Fixed-effects panel estimation is prefered to random  effects because of the 
maintained hypothesis of regional diversity in the relationship between crime 
rates and their correlates.  Moreover, a 
2 χ  Hausman test statistic [Hausman and 
Taylor, 1981] for the null of no correlation between the exogenous variable   
vector and the disturbances, applied to the 3SLS model for the entire sample, 
stands at a value of 5133.29, making random-effects estimates biased and 
inconsistent within any acceptable significance level [Baltagi, 1995].  
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force, total government consumption and service activity. The set, 
however, differs in each unit because differing are the 
correlations between them and the first-stage OLS residuals of 
eqs. 1-4. For each unit, only the signifcantly close-to-zero 
correlations are retained
12. 
  The 3SLS parameter estimates are exhibited in Table 3, with 
the three columns respectively corresponding to the entire nation, 
to the North and to the South, and four major rows corresponding 
to eqs. 1-4, therein replicated. Also included are the IPS [Im et 
al., 1997] 'tbar' no-trend stationarity tests (Sect. 2) for each 
equation's residuals, to check for omitted variables bias. The 
reader is reminded that the 5% critical value for the nation (20 
individuals and 16 observations) is -1.87 and for the two areas 
(11 and 9 individuals, respectively) is -2.05. The null of 
stationarity cannot be rejected, apparently, for any residual 
series.  
  The 3SLS model is mostly not static by construction, since the 
first equation is already expressed in dynamic terms (dc t ), while 
the other two include lags of the first-differenced endogenous 
variables as regressors (dp t  and dr t ). Only the last equation is 
static by construction, and incomes are nonstationary, as from 
Table 2. In such case, its parameter estimates would be biased and 
inconsistent because of their correlation with the individual-
specific effects. This would require a dynamic GMM panel 
representation of the equation if not, by extension,  of the 
entire model  [Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Baltagi, 1995]. However, as seen from Table 3, the reported IPS 
test statistics of disturbances significantly reject the omitted-
variable bias hypothesis for all four equations both at the 
national and regional level. Hence, a dynamic GMM panel run is 
superfluous, although a double check has been duly performed
13. 
  Simple eyeballing reveals differing parameter magnitudes 
and/or signs among the North  and the South, as a result of area-
specific fixed effects. A significance test of the null hypothesis 
of no parameter diversity among regions is performed by means of a 
                                                           
12 With a procedure similar to standard instrument identification testing 
[Staiger and Stock, 1997], each available  instrument was regressed against the 
first-stage OLS residual vector of eqs. 1-4. The null of zero-parameter vector 
(as a proxy for zero correlation) was tested by means of a standard exclusion F-
test: when significantly different from zero the instrument was dropped. As a 
result, most if not all of the instruments were dropped for the South, while 
quite a few were retained for the North. 
 
13 The dynamic panel representation of eqs. 1-4 is performed by applying the 
method required for persistent series [Bond et al, 2001], a variant of standard 
modeling [e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991] where the endogenous and exogenous 
variables are expressed in levels, lags of the endogenous variables are 
included, and the instruments are suitably lagged levels and first differences 
of both. This procedure enables to retain the same structure as the 3SLS model - 
thereby not imposing first differencing in the constituent equations - and to 
create moment conditions with instruments uncorrelated with the individual-
specific effects. The (unreported) results are all in line with those shown in 
Table 3 as they exhibit the same parameter signs, a proof that the dynamics 
imposed upon the equations of the 3SLS model produces consistent and unbiased 
estimates and no mispecification bias. 
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Hausman test, distributed under the null as a 
2 χ  statistic with as 
many degrees of freedom as the number of parameters in the system, 
which is 20. Its value is 410.33, leading to rejection of equality 
of the parameters within any plausible significance level. 
  Generally speaking, at both national and regional area levels 
the parameter estimates produced the following prima facie 
results: 
1. Nationwide and in Northern Italy, judicial repression plays no 
significant role at styming property crime supply, contrary to   
police prevention and to percapita incomes whose impacts bear the 
expected signs. In Southern Italy, instead, only police prevention 
works well, whereas percapita incomes are insufficiently able at 
driving potential crime entrants away and, even more so, justice 
appears to significantly foster crime rather than to reduce it. 
The 'high-loot' hypothesis (according to which higher incomes 
attract crime) and the 'backfire' hypothesis (harsher judicial 
repression causes higher crime via prison inmate spillovers) do 
not thus hold nationwide and in Northern Italy, but significantly 
hold for Southern Italy. 
2. Not unexpectedly from the above results, the steady-state 
supply of crime is higher in the South due to local spillovers, 
typically associated to high violent crime shares and recidiveness 
(fn. 6) and ultimately to organized crime. 
3. Demand for crime, i.e. law and order enforcement enacted by the 
appointed institutions, is affected by lack of stigma only in the 
South, while overload and other forms of inefficiencies and 
deficiencies are quite evenly distributed across the country, 
especially with judicial repression. In spite of that, noteworthy 
is the commitment of police toward stemming the difficult crime 
situation in the South. 
4. Also evenly distributed across the nation - with no significant 
regional diversity - is the response of demand for crime to income 
incentives, in terms of institutionally granted lower deterrence 
and tighter rules against apprehension and incarceration that tend 
to trade off property rights with individual rights. With the 
benefit of historical hindsight that traces back to the early 
Seventies, this evidence is the end result of controversial socio-
political arrangements oftentimes hotly debated, amended and 
enacted with parliamentary laws, a phenomenon typical of young 
evolving democracies [Putnam, 1993]. 
5. The income equation is highly diversified at the regional 
level: there is strong evidence in the South of crime still 
substituting for legal activities (i.e. labor supply), as a 
collateral effect of violent and organized crime, wheras 
prevention fails to foster local economic growth. 
  These general results are more specifically analyzed and 
scrutinized in the subsequent comments that relate to the single 
equations, according to their ascending order presented in Sect. 
3.  
  Some of the results are shared by comparable analyses for 
Italy [Marselli and Vannini, 1996, 1997] and other countries as 
well [Ehrlich and Brower, 1987; Taylor, 1978; Wolpin, 1978;  Wong,  
1995; Entorf and Spengler, 2000]. Specifically, however, the split 
effect of deterrence variables in eq. 1 (parameters φ 11 and φ 12 )   19
is very different in all columns: while police prevention 
negatively affects crime supply within any acceptable  level of 
significance, judicial repression plays no significant role 
whatsoever, and in the South it even lends support to an 
unpleasant 'backfire' effect, certainly double-linked with mafia-
type imprisonment spillovers [Clear, 1996]
14. 
  No better fares for Southern Italy the income-level positive 
'incentive effect' implied by parameter φ 2 . It carries the 
expected negative sign only nationwide and in Northern Italy, 
wherein higher incomes involve greater earning and job 
opportunities that substitute for crime, and drive potential 
criminals off the illegal market [Ehrlich and Brower, 1987; van 
Dijk, 1994]. The income parameter in the South is essentially 
insignificant, and may thus to a certain extent call for the 
nonrejection of the 'high-loot' hypothesis. On top of that, stands 
for the South a steady-state crime supply higher than in the 
North, derivable from the inertial adjustment parameter φ 3 . 
Mechanical application of the rule to predict it (see fn. 9), 
places the South some 35% higher than the North. Local 
'spillovers' [Sah, 1991; van Dijk, 1994] stemming from organized 
crime (e.g. mafia) that continually foster new entrants and 
recidiveness are most likely responsible for this evidence.  
  As to demand for crime (eqs. 2-3), only in the North do both 
deterrents exhibit a significantly positive 'stigma-for-crime' 
degree, expressed as the official willingness to fight crime 
[Cameron, 1996] (parameters α 13 and α 23), measured in the present 
context as the number of extant incarcerations and sentences with 
respect to the extant crime stock, a gauge of quantitative state 
response to crime. These parameters are instead insignificantly 
different from zero in the South. This result may be influenced, 
other things equal, by the different social texture of some areas 
of the South which exhibit ample mafia-type  spillovers and where 
local customs provide an off-limits situation to state 
intervention, with consequential retrenchment of the authorities' 
presence  [Putnam, 1993]. 
  Income incentives over deterrence (parameters α 11 and α 21) 
are everywhere negatively signed (except for the police in the 
South, where they are not significantly different from zero), to 
unmistakeably herald that the individual-property rights tradeoff 
hypothesis tightly and significantly holds and is decidedly tilted 
in favor of individual rights in the form of reduced police 
incarcerations and judiciary sentencing. In practice,  defense and 
protection of individual rights receive a priority lane with 
respect to property rights, except for police prevention in the 
South where a heavy-handed control of organized and violent crime 
appears preferable.  
  The parameters representing the 'overload' hypothesis (α 12  
                                                           
14 The larger and definitely more significant impact of prevention with respect 
to repression conforms with the certainty/severity hypothesis applicable to a 
risk-averse potential property criminal, rationally engaged at outweighing the 
probability of being caught with the legal and extralegal costs associated to 
conviction [Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1975, 1996; Taylor, 1987].  
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and  α 22) attest everywhere to the existence of mutual agreements 
toward reducing the degree of law enforcement. One notable 
exception is police in the South: this posture appears to be 
tightly related to its commitment at defending property rights, as 
noted above, with no ensuing interference from other sources. The 
judiciary, instead, appear to be seriously committed at shunning 
property crime incarceration processing with particular emphasis 
in the South, thereby offsetting the preventive stance of police, 
and lending support to some anedoctal evidence that wants career 
crminals - most of which associated to mafia groups - being 
oftentimes granted benefits and waivers  uncommon even in other 
democratic societies. In general, however, overload in Italy is 
associated with serious prison capacity constraints, general 
amnesties and reduction of sentence terms, coupled with political 
vested interests, electoral targets and local fund mismanagement
15. 
  The parameters representing the cyclical ceilings to crime 
(ϕ 1 and  ϑ 1 ) and the productivity ceilings (ϕ 2  and ϑ 2 ) yield 
mixed results. The reader is cursorily reminded that the former 
kind of ceilings is taken to reflect the adjustment speed with 
which authorities respond to incoming crime, i.e. the inprisonment 
and judgement response rates of the appointed authorities. 
Similarly, the productivity ceilings - other things equal - 
reflect their activity returns, i.e. the curvature of their own 
production function. 
  At both the national and regional levels, the crime ceiling is 
not significant for the judiciary but significantly negative for 
the police, except for the South. Intuitively, the first of these 
results appears to be quite obvious insofar as treatment of 
incoming crime does not institutionally pertain to the judiciary. 
Judges are in fact held responsible for acting upon extant and not 
incoming apprehended criminals, which are customarily first-
filtered through the police.  
  The negativity of the crime ceiling parameter, instead, casts 
a shadow on the efficiency of police to keep up with crime-supply 
dynamics, with special reference to Northern Italy whose parameter 
is high in absolute terms and compares with the non significance 
of its counterpart in Southern Italy. This evidence underlies a   
shift of police commitment to ensure law and order from less to 
more dangerous crime situations and/or areas like the South, 
characterized by higher homicide and violent property crime rates 
(fn. 6). 
  Productivity ceilings negatively affect the judiciary 
sentencing output everywhere in the country and across regions 
with and indisputable level of significance,  a fact that supports 
the widely-held anedoctal evidence of traditionally lenghty 
backlog-ridden procedures in the vast majority of courts of the 
country
16. 
                                                           
15 Systematic lack or coverup of relevant data regarding prison expenses and beds 
available in Italy, made public in many nations [United Nations, 1994], is one 
possible example of local fund mismanagement. 
 
16 Reliable statistics [CRENOS, 1999] reveal that, for the period scrutinized and 
for the entire nation, the mean length of a criminal case from police filing to 
first-degree ruling (Low Court) is 140 days, and from the latter down to the   21
  Police staffing, that is, the amount of police stationed 
(parameter  ϕ 3  in eq. 2) bears no significant contribution to 
prevention both nationwide and in the North, while in the South it 
carries a negative sign whose significance stands well within 10%. 
Such mixed results are shared by some studies on other countries 
[Taylor, 1987; Levitt, 1997], but not by other studies on Italy in 
which police staffing enters as a regressor of the supply-of-crime 
equation [Marselli and Vannini, 1996, 1997]. As an alternative to 
the current specification, inclusion of police numbers into eq. 1 
in previous regression runs produced very similar results. 
Structural long-run motives such as general education and 
training, especially in patroling, apprehension and investigation 
practices, are likely candidates for the outcome. For the South, 
overmanning due to high-crime exigencies is an additional 
candidate, obviously linked to the high degree of law enforcement 
commitment encountered above
17. 
  Eq. 4, finally, exhibits the expected signs and acceptable 
significance levels of both parameters of labor force and human 
capital (ω 1  and ω 2 ) only for the entire nation and for both 
regional areas as well, but in the South labor exhibits a much 
lower elasticity than in the North
18. Moreover, crime supply 
(parameter  ω 3 ) acts as a hamper to economic growth by carrying 
the correct sign only in the South, whereas elsewhere it is 
positively signed. 
  This latter unexpected feature begs a thorny answer that may 
reside in the following explanation: since crime supply is 
negatively affected only by police deterrence and unaffected by 
income incentives in the South, labor force is still partly driven 
away from contributing to income - as confirmed by its low 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
final-degree ruling (Court of Appeals and Supreme Court) is 680 days. This puts 
the average trial length well beyond 2 years, including also the mean time 
served in prison ahead of the first court hearing. In addition, and for the same 
period, the current percent share of completed to incumbent procedures is 
roughly 70% for first-degree sentences and less than 40% for the other. 
 
17 Levitt [1997] cites budget and electoral ciclicality as the main causes of low 
enforcement productivity of police staffing. In the present context, however, 
cyclicalities are excluded because previous regression runs found them to be 
insignificant. This occurs because in Italy, different from the United States, 
budgeting of police and courts is determined by the central government and 
enacted with parliamentary laws, that bear no relationship with local 
constituency periodical elections. Further, failure of police staffing to 
significantly affect incarcerations may be consistent with the low percentage of  
reported to unreported crimes, insofar as the former acts as a proxy of the 
latter [Marselli and Vannini, 1996, 1997], (fn. 8). 
 
18 The sizably higher labor elasticity detected in the North with respect to that 
of the South (parameter ω 1 ) originates from a larger covariance/variance ratio 
of incomes and employment of the panel-transformed series, which respectively 
amount to .735 and .153. While industrial output would surely furnish a better 
representation of a production function (a matter that cannot be pursued here), 
measurement errors of the employment variable (Sect. 2) could be responsible for 
the result. One fact stands clear however: per capita incomes, as a rough proxy 
of mean productivity, are significantly higher in the North (Sect. 2), thereby 
providing a justification for the large regional differential of parameter ω 1 . 
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elasticity - and simultaneously acts as a significant substitute 
for legal activities, especially in some areas under the control 
of mafia-type groups. On the contrary, crime in the North is a 
complement to labor, which sizably contributes to incomes as 
evidenced by the magnitude of its elasticity. In that area, in 
practice, crime supply is superimposed on the existing labor 
force, as it sizably originates from elsewhere, due to crime 
mobility from  the South and from abroad (Sect. 2).  
  At the same time, the deterrence parameters (ω 4  and ω 5 ) 
positively affect incomes, acting as a property-rights protection 
vehicle, only for the entire nation and for Northern Italy, 
leaving the South wrong-signed with one of the two. This result is 
consistent with the higher degree of property-rights retrenchment 
in the South by the authorities (parameters α 11 and α 21) and with 
the magnitude and significance of the productivity ceilings (ϕ 2  
and ϑ 2 ) 
  Incidentally, the signs of the reported parameters related to 
the incentives of eq. 1 are consistent (after discounting for 
statistical errors) with their theoretical construct shown in 
Sect. 1 and in the Appendix. In fact, as shown above, the signs of 
the 'stigma' for crime and of the impacts of labor and crime 
supply over incomes are all positive for the North and differently 
signed in the South, thereby providing the necessary and 
sufficient condition for  the crime incentive parameters to take 
the actually reported signs. In other words, since stigma is 
absent in the South and crime partly substitutes  for  labor in 
determining incomes, the latter in turn - coupled with a 
significant 'backfire' - provide on average perverse incentive 
effects over the crime supply. 
 
 
                      Sect. 5. CONCLUSIONS.                       
 
     The  empirical  results  of  a  supply-demand  simultaneous  model   
of property crime behavior and law enforcement applied to the 
entire nation and to its two culturally different regions - the 
North and the South - in spite of some problems in data 
availability and reporting, errors in variables and regional 
differences in the estimated parameters, leads to the following 
general conclusions:  
 i. Crime supply is effectively checked only by police prevention 
at any geographical level, while judiciary repression bears no 
role or even causes criminal spillovers in the South, while in 
that area income levels are affected by crime-for-labor 
substitution and thus, in turn, provide no serious check to crime 
supply itself. Certainty scores a much higher and definitely more 
significant rank with respect to severity as a tap to crime. 
  ii. The steady-state crime supply is higher in the South as 
the upshot of a social texture traditionally more open to 
spillovers, in the form of crime entries and recidives, and 
ultimately to violent and organized crime. No wonder, by 
consequence, if the contribution of legal activities to Southern 
incomes is low as compared to the North, and if crime still   23
significantly substitutes for labor.  
 iii. Crime demand everywhere in the country produces a generally 
low official state response, and is afflicted by several 
inefficiencies and deficiencies like lack of stigma in the South, 
a remarkable tilt toward defense of individual rights as opposed 
to property rights (especially in the North), operational overload 
except with police in the South, sluggish if not collusive 
response to crime by the judiciary, and low productivity of police 
staffing. 
  If the stepping up of a rampant property crime rate is 
regarded as a relevant issue at the national level as well as  in 
the administrative and political authorities' agenda, several       
policy suggestions addressed at strengthening law enforcement are 
in order, amongst which of major relevance are the need of:   
raising the training and educational standards of the appointed 
institutions; relaxing, if not thwarting, the collusive 
arrangements among them and between them and the offenders; and 
finally fostering economic  growth in the South as a substitute 








































       
                      Table 3.                             
 
Fixed-effects 3SLS parameters of eqs. 1-4, Italy, North and South, period 1980-
95 (standard errors in brackets), and IPS 'tbar' test statistics of regression 
residuals. 
 
              ITALY              NORTH               SOUTH  
               (1)                (2)                 (3) 
 
Eq.1.  dc t =  φ 11p t  +  φ 12 r t  + φ 2 y t  + φ 3 c t  + η 1,t  
          (1)                (2)                 (3) 
φ 11         -.668 (.01)         -.778 (.08)         -.538 (.18)  
φ 12          -.085 (.07)**       -.153 (.13)**        .185 (.08)  
φ 2         -1.416 (.24)         -.986 (.34)          .575 (.38)**  
φ 3           .734 (.11)           .531 (.11)         -.318 (.10) 
IPS        -2.572               -2.779         -2.298  
 
Eq.2.   p t =  α 11y t  +  α 12 r t  + α 13c t + ϕ 1 dc t  + ϕ 2 dp t  + ϕ 3 s t + η 2,t 
   (1)                (2)                 (3) 
α 11        -2.116 (.36)         -1.621 (.42)         -.538 (.18)**  
α 12          -.139 (.11)**        -.383 (.14)         .114 (.08)**  
α 13         1.102 (.16)           .711 (.15)         .390 (.28)**  
ϕ 1         -1.497 (.02)         -1.133 (.12)         .060 (.42)**  
ϕ 2           .001 (.01)**         .009 (.03)**      -.452 (.19) 
ϕ 3        -.005 (.01)**         .100 (.09)**       -.452 (.17)* 
IPS        -2.329               -2.585               -2.907 
 
Eq.3.  r t =  α 21y t  +  α 22 p t  + α 23 c t + ϑ 1 dc t  + ϑ 2 dr t  + η 3,t  
   (1)                (2)                 (3) 
α 21        -2.113 (.36)         -1.687 (.08)       -2.558 (.59)          
α 22          -.672 (.39)*        -.599 (.29)        -.916 (.44)  
α 23           .879 (.34)          .605 (.33)*        .180 (.22)** 
ϑ 1          -.635 (.62)**       -.181 (.39)**        .035 (.48)** 
ϑ 2          -.501 (.13)         -.163 (.09)*        -.966 (.21) 
IPS           -2.609               -2.438            -2.581 
 
Eq. 4. y t =  ω 1 l t  +  ω 2 h t  + ω 3 dc t  + ω 4 p t  + ω 5 r t + η 4,t 
      (1)                (2)                 (3) 
ω 1           .640 (.13)           .879 (.29)         .270 (.12) 
ω 2           .157 (.01)           .164 (.01)         .128 (.01)  
ω 3           .149 (.05)           .478 (.06)        -.082 (.04) 
ω 4           .069 (.03)           .285 (.05)        -.148 (.03)   25
ω 5           .070 (.01)           .105 (.05)         .041 (.01)  
IPS           -1.951               -3.149           -2.215 
 
*   Parameter not significant at 5% p value.  
**  Parameter not significant at 10% p value.  
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                            APPENDIX.                             
 
  Let the discrete-state Hamiltonian function (H) derived from 
eq. I (Sect. 1) be 
 
     H = C t
ν L t
v 1−  + .5 (θ 1 RP t + θ 2 Y t
2 )  +  11 ,t+ λ  ( 1 α Y t  +  2 α RP t  +  3 α C t )  
      +  21 ,t+ λ  ( 1 β Y t  +  2 β L t  +  3 β C t )  
 
with C t  and L t  the controls, RP t  and Y t  the states,  11 ,t+ λ  and  21 ,t+ λ  
the costates, and time t  ∈ T . The Hamiltonian first derivatives 
with respect to its arguments are:  
 
A1. δ H/δ C t   = 0 = U'(C t ) +  3 α 11 ,t+ λ  +  3 β 21 ,t+ λ  
A2. δ H/δ L t   = 0 = U'(L t ) +  2 β 21 ,t+ λ  
A3. δ H/δ RP t  =  11 ,t+ λ  -  1,t λ  = - (θ 1 RP t + θ 2 Y t  +  2 α 11 ,t+ λ ) 
A4. δ H/δ Y t   =  21 ,t+ λ  -  2,t λ  = - (θ 1 RP t + θ 2 Y t  +  1 α 11 ,t+ λ  +  1 β 21 ,t+ λ ) 
 
with the transversality condition  Lim
t→∞  ( 1,t λ RP t  +  2,t λ Y t ) = 0, and 
where, from the Cobb-Douglas utility function in eq. I (Sect.1) 
 
U'(C t ) = ν(L t /C t )
1−ν > 0, U'(L t ) = (1-ν)(C t /L t )
ν  > 0;  
U''(C t ) = -ν(1-ν)C t
ν−2
L t
1−ν < 0 , U''(L t ) = -ν(1-ν)C t
ν L t
−+ () 1 ν  < 0. 
 
  From eqs. A1 and A2 we have  
 
A11.  11 ,t+ λ  = -[U'(C t )+ 3 β 21 ,t+ λ ]/ 3 α  = -[ 2 β U'(C t )+ 3 β U'(L t )]/ 3 α 2 β ] 
A21.  21 ,t+ λ  = -[U'(L t )/ 2 β ] 
 
whose time first-differencing yields 
 
A13.  11 ,t+ λ  -  1,t λ  = - [U''(C t )(dC t /dt)/ 3 α ]+[ 3 β U''(L t )(dL t /dt)/ 3 α 2 β ] 
A23.  21 ,t+ λ  -  2,t λ  = - [U''(L t )(dL t /dt)/ 2 β ] 
 
where dC t /dt and dL t /dt are the first differences of the implied 
variables with respect to time t. Equating A13 and A23 to A3 and 
A4, respectively, yields after some manipulation, the following 
pair 
 
dC t /dt = ( 3 α /U''(C t )){ [ 3 β U''(L t )(dL t /dt)/ 3 α 2 β ]+(θ 1 RP t +  θ 2 Y t )-    
    [ 2 α U'(C t )/ 3 α ]+[ 2 α U'(L t )/ 3 α 2 β ] }   30
dL t /dt = [ 2 β (θ 1 RP t + θ 2 Y t )/U''(L t )]-[ 1 α 2 β U'(C t )/ 3 α U''(L t )]- 
       [γ U''(L t )/ 3 α 2 β ] 
 
where γ  =  3 α 1 β + 1 α 3 β . 
  Substituting the second equation into the first and then 
solving for dc t = dC t /dt - dL t /dt, the time derivative of percapita 
crime, yields 
 
A5. dc t  =  
      { [( 3 α + 3 β )/U''(C t )]-( 2 β /U''(L t )) }(θ 1 RP t + θ 2 Y t ) - 
      [ 1 α ( 3 α + 3 β )/ 3 α (1-ν)][U'(C t )/U''(C t )] +  
      [ 3 β (γ 2 β + 1 α 3 β )/ 2 β ][U'(L t )/U''(C t )] - 
         [ 1 α γ 2 β  U'(L t ) -  1 α 2 β U'(C t )]/ 3 α U''(L t ) 
 
 Since  U'(C t )/U''(C t ) = - (C t )/(1-ν), substitution of this 
value into A5 and division of its RHS elements by L t , to conform 
with percapita requirement imposed by use of dc t , finally yields 
the following supply-of-crime equation  
 
A6. dc t  = 
  { [( 3 α + 3 β )/U''(C t )]-( 2 β /U''(L t )) }(θ 1 RP t /L t + θ 2 Y t /L t ) + 
     [ 1 α ( 3 α + 3 β )/ 3 α (1-ν)](C t /L t ) + B 
 
where B = [ 3 β (γ 2 β + 1 α 3 β )/ 2 β ][U'(L t )/U''(C t )] - 
          [ 1 α γ 2 β  U'(L t ) -  1 α 2 β U'(C t )]/ 3 α U''(L t ) 
 
  Eq. A6 exactly corresponds to eq. IV of Sect.1. The term 
( 3 α + 3 β )/U''(C t )]-( 2 β /U''(L t )), which relates crime supply to both 
incentives (RP t /L t  and Y t /L t ), is expected to be negative if  3 α , 
2 β >0 and  3 β <0 and | 3 α | > | 3 β |, or simply if  3 α , 2 β , 3 β >0. In 
addition, as a sufficient condition, we should have U''(C t ) < 
U''(L t ), i.e. the marginal utility of crime falls at a more rapid 
pace than that of labor (crime 'pays' less than labor). Numerical 
experiments with available percapita data show that for the entire 
nation, on average, assuming ν = .05, U''(C t )= -.004 and U''(L t ) = 
-.134. The ratio does not significantly change for higher values 
of ν. Hence the entire term is outrightly negative, unless | 3 α | ≅  
| 3 β | and, adjusted by θ 1  and θ 2 , theoretically corresponds to 
parameters  1 φ  and  2 φ  of eq. IV. 
 The  term  1 α ( 3 α + 3 β )/ 3 α (1-ν) represents the crime dynamics 
adjustment parameter  3 φ  of eq. IV. Depending on the signs of 
3 α , 2 β , 3 β  it may take a positive or negative value, but must in any   31
case ensure by construction positive values of the steady-state 
crime stock (fn. 9). The constant term B, as constructed, is 
undefined in sign but irrelevant, especially in the light of 
fixed-effect panel estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 